"Innovation Studies": the Invention of a Specialty
The study of technological innovation is over one hundred year old (anthropology, history, sociology, management, policy and economics). However, over the last twenty years or so, "innovation studies" has become a label used by many to name research concerned specifically with the economics, policy and management of technological innovation. What are the origins of this specialty? There is no linear history, but two completely different traditions. Part I was concerned with the American tradition on 'technological change' while Part II (this paper) concentrates on the European tradition ('innovation studies').
Abstract
Innovation has become a very popular category over the twentieth century. However, few have stopped to study the origins of the category and to critically examine the studies produced on innovation. This paper conducts such an analysis on one type of innovation, namely technological innovation.
The study of technological innovation is over one hundred years old. From the early 1900s onward, anthropologists, sociologists historians, and economists began theorizing about technological innovation, each from his own respective disciplinary framework. However, in the last forty years an economic and "dominant" understanding of technological innovation has developed: technological innovation defined as commercialized invention. This paper documents the origins of this idea and the tradition of research to which it gave rise: "innovation studies". More specifically, it analyzes what distinguishes this tradition from that concerned with technological change as the use of inventions in industrial production, and looks at why such a tradition originated in Europe.
Innovation is far too important to be left to scientists and technologists. It is also far too important to be left to economists or social scientists (Freeman, 1974: 309) .
"Innovation Studies":
The Invention of a Specialty (Part II) 1 
Introduction
In 1974, British economist Christopher Freeman reported that few economists "have stopped to examine" technological innovation (Freeman, 1974: 16) . This is a much repeated statement in the literature on technological innovation. Economists would have come late to the study of technological innovation. But late compared to when and to whom? From a long-term perspective, the statement deserves qualification. Whether one looks at A. Smith, John Rae or William Stanley Jevons, economic writings on invention and the use of machines in production, although often short, did in fact exist (Macleod, 2008) , and 'art' as a production factor was discussed among the mercantilists early on (Johnson, 1930) . Furthermore, at the time of Freeman's writing, the systematic study of technological innovation existed for many decades among anthropologists and sociologists and was a specialty already. Leaving aside economic historians like A. P.
Usher and W. Rupert Maclaurin, there was also an economic tradition named technological change, as a precursor to the term technological innovation.
The economic tradition regarding technological change is concerned with innovation as technological invention used (introduced) in the industrial production process (Godin, 2010a) . It is not concerned with the origins of technological innovations. It is not alone.
The tradition simply follows the sociologists, who focus on the use (adoption) of inventions, whatever their origin. At the time, among economists, only economic historians like W. Rupert Maclaurin and his colleagues at MIT got into the so-called "black box", but Maclaurin soon got forgotten, although his ideas have remained influential for decades, in obliterated form (Godin, 2008) . 1 A first draft of this paper was presented at a workshop on 'The Rhetoric of Innovation in Contemporary Society', University of Helsinki, 7-8 February 2010. paper (Godin, 2010a) . There, I showed how interest in invention among economists gave way to interest in technological change. The next step occurred with the study of technological innovation, the focus of this paper. This paper documents the European tradition as an invention or "original" construction and examines why it emerged in Europe. The tradition developed using three "rhetorical" steps: 2 -Combinations: selecting previous and existing knowledge.
-New perspectives: bringing forth new ideas and a new conceptual framework.
-Legitimizations: rationalizing and giving identity to the tradition with reference to key authors.
I use Chris Freeman as a case-study. (Invention as well as) innovation has for over a century been defined as combining existing knowledge in a new way. In this sense, Freeman is certainly an innovator. No one will deny that he is a major author on technological innovation studies. In this paper, I study him as the 'founder' (or one of the builders) of the second tradition. I examine his 1974 book The Economics of Industrial Innovation, and the additions made to it in the second edition (1982) . The latter has remained a much cited work ever since its publication. In it, Freeman invented a new tradition, and for years many students returned to this book to study the field and the ideas involved.
My aim is to go beneath the framework and the rationale used to study technological innovation in the second tradition by documenting the way Freeman originally framed this tradition. I do not dwell on the details of technological innovation studies. Over the years, Freeman himself did a better job than I could do, and many others continue to do so (Fagerberg et al., 2005) . I confine myself to the general orientations, or conceptual framework, of the tradition. This paper is not deferential to Freeman; neither is it 2 Rhetorical is not used in a pejorative sense here. In line with the "new rhetoric", it means the use of arguments to make a case and persuade an audience (readers) of a point or view.
'censorius'. I look at both his positive contribution to technological innovation studies and the 'biases' he carried into the field. To my understanding, these biases are not necessarily negative, but rather are simply those of an economist's point of view, more specifically an economist with a view to the 'appliedness' or application of his findings.
Freeman's Representation of Innovation
To Freeman, technological innovation is "an essential condition of economic progress and a critical element in the competitive struggle of enterprises and of nation-states". It is also important for improving the quality of life (Freeman, 1974: 15) . Given the centrality of technological innovation to modern society, Freeman's purpose in The Economics of Industrial Innovation is the study of the "system" behind the phenomenon, namely "the professionalized industrial R&D [research and development] system". He identifies three characteristics of this system over time: its growing complexity, the increased scale of processes, and the specialization of research work (Freeman, 1974: 25, 33) . 3 To
Freeman, research is conducted in professional specialized laboratories, as opposed to the past when research was unorganized and much more a trial-and-error affair. This is a familiar description, suggested by industrialists and historians since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, these people spoke of the institutionalization of research, not its professionalization as Freeman did. As a matter of fact, professionalization refers to the social process by which an occupation transforms itself into a body, group or association with qualifications and identity credentials (like diplomas, journals and grants, in the case of scientists). This is not what Freeman was interested in, despite his use of the term. Freeman was rather interested in institutionalization: when and how research and scientists got into organizations, in the present case industries.
Be that as it may, to Freeman the twentieth century is the growth period of the "researchintensive sector" and saw the rise of a "research-intensive economy": "the balance has gradually shifted towards a more research-intensive economy, and a higher rate of technical change. It is the contention of this book that this is one of the most important changes in twentieth-century industry" (Freeman, 1974: 277) . To the increase in scale and "professionalization", Freeman adds the idea that technology relies increasingly on science, giving rise to what Freeman called "science-related technologies". Together, these three characteristics of the R&D system strongly suggest the need to "monitor and control the direction and pace of technical change" (Freeman, 1974: 31) .
To Freeman, the monitoring and controlling of technology "depends upon understanding,
and an important part of this understanding relates to economic aspects of the process, such as costs, return on investment, market structure, rate of growth and distribution of possible benefits" (Freeman, 1974: 32) . Freeman deplores the "elementary state of our present knowledge" (Freeman, 1974: 32) . To Freeman, invention and innovation are "outside the framework of economic models, or more strictly, exogenous variables". It remains a residual (Freeman, 1974: 17) , a black-box (Freeman, 1974: 27 ). Freeman's objective is to open the black box and look at the technological innovation "process".
What is innovation? In a footnote, Freeman brings in the following definitions:
"Technical innovation or simply innovation is used to describe the introduction and spread of new and improved products and processes in the economy and technological innovation to describe advances in knowledge" (Freeman, 1974: 18) . However, the book is fundamentally concerned with following a definition of innovation as distinct from invention, a distinction which Freeman attributes to Schumpeter and states as follows:
"An invention is an idea, a sketch or a model for a new or improved device, product, process or system (...). An innovation in the economic sense is accomplished only with the first commercial transaction" (Freeman, 1974: 22) . This is an important distinction to which I return below.
Having offered a rationale (the importance of technological innovation for society, and the poor state of knowledge we have on the phenomenon) and a definition of innovation (as commercialized technological invention), Freeman conducts his analysis in three steps (parts). Part I of the book looks at "science-related technologies" based on a "historical approach" designed to illustrate the three basic aspects of the R&D system: growing complexity, increased scale of processes, and specialization of research work. It documents the rise of "new research-based industries" (also called "research-intensive industries" in chapters 7 and 8) in chemicals (including oil refining), nuclear energy, synthetic materials and electronics (radio, television, radar, computers and electronic components). "It is the contention of this book that the[se] industries (…) represent the most important trends of technical change" (Freeman, 1974: 37) . Freeman admits that readers may wish to skip this historical part, but they should do so at their own peril (Freeman, 1974: 33) .
Having studied the professionalization of the R&D process in Part I, Freeman next turns to how it has changed the behaviour of firms. Part II offers empirical evidence designed to "support or refute" theories of technological innovation in relation to firms. Freeman looks at factors which lead to success and failure in technological innovation, the size of firms most conductive to technological innovation, the difficulties of decision-making given the inherent uncertainty and risk of technological innovation, and the strategies available to firms for coping with this uncertainty. Here, he offers the rudiments of an 'evolutionary' alternative to neo-classical economics: firms do not maximize and are not rational optimizers, but rather adapt continuously to changes in the environment (technical change and market competition).
Part III concentrates on government and policies. Freeman discusses public funding of R&D and changing priorities. He compares research expenditures of a "militaryindustrial complex" type and big science since World War II to emerging demands and values on technological innovations more oriented toward consumers' needs. He suggests that "a more explicit policy for science and technical innovation is increasingly necessary" (Freeman, 1974: 31) for "assisting firms" and for technological innovation of a more social nature, rather than an implicit policy, or worse, "laissez-innover".
A Construction
Every theory or theoretical essay is a construction in many senses. Sociology generally focuses on the determinants (individual and social) that are necessarily involved a scientist's invention or innovation. In this paper, I look rather at construction in the sense of creative imagination: combining existing ideas (or things) to produce new ones, as the early psychology of imagination suggested, as many still define innovation today and as
Freeman does (Freeman, 1974: 167-69; 253 Freeman starts with what he calls "a historical approach". He may have got this approach from Schumpeter, to whom studies of a historical type are more appropriate than those of classical economics for the analysis of technological innovation. "What we really need", once stated Schumpeter, "we are more likely to find in general economic histories", above all "monographs on individual industries" (Schumpeter, 1939: 221) . There were also some examples dealing with this approach from an influential conference held in Economic Research (NBER, 1962 (Godin, 2008) . According to Freeman himself, his historical outline is "very sketchy and is intended to give the background" to recent developments (Freeman, 1974: 45) . 4 It is history designed to give the reader a perspective on what comes next: the study of firms. It is contextual history designed to support a point of view, an economic point of view. According to Freeman, it is history "from the standpoint of the economist" where "attention is concentrated on costs, patents, size of firm, marketing and time lags" (Freeman, 1974: 39 Nelson and Winter (1982) .
Finally, Part III of the book, on policy and government, essentially makes use of OECD statistics to discuss recent trends in public funding of R&D Nelson, Peck and Kalachek (1967) , and Mansfield (1968) . These two syntheses combined micro and macro economic perspectives in a way not different from that of Freeman (more on this below). 
New Perspectives
I highlight only two perspectives from Freeman and the tradition. This is certainly a biased selection. Two considerations drove my selection. First, the perspectives are macro, and explain many micro perspectives one would find missing in my analysis.
Second, they clearly distinguish this tradition from the first one on technological change.
The two perspectives are:
-A study of innovation as commercialization. This explains the study of the innovation process, from invention to diffusion.
-A consideration of policy issues. This gave rise to an applied or policy-oriented specialty.
I have deliberately not included the 'institutional' perspective, a major one according to the promoters of the tradition. As a matter of fact, a lot has been written on the institutional perspective as a distinctive trait of the tradition. To many authors in the tradition, this perspective serves to distinguish the tradition from the literature produced by mainstream economists (Nelson, 1993; . It gave rise to a whole literature on a National Innovation System. This perspective is certainly absent from the econometric approach of the first tradition. In the present case, the perspective is mainly descriptive, although it makes use of statistics. In fact, another distinctive trait of the tradition is that researchers conduct their own surveys (like the SAPPHO project at SPRU in the early 1970s) rather than using only official statistics (this has changed recently with national innovation surveys conducted by governments and their statistical bureaus).
Innovation as Commercialization
The study of technological invention introduced in industrial production is the bread and butter of the tradition on technological change. In this tradition, technology being used represents technological innovation -but without using the term (the tradition talks of technological change rather than innovation). This is in fact one meaning of innovation. It is widely shared by many researchers, including sociologists.
The tradition on technological change emerged in the 1930s, when the issue of technological unemployment of the previous century re-emerged (Godin, 2010a) .
Technologies were sources of unemployment, so many then said, but to others they were sources of productivity for firms too. Economists started measuring labour productivity (assumed to be due to changes in factors of production) as an indicator of technology: an increase in labour productivity is an indicator of technology used in industrial production.
Economists from many horizons (governmental organizations like the US Works Projects Administration, non-profit organizations like the US NBER) contributed dozens of studies. Thereafter, academics formalized the discussion using the production function (an equation linking the quantity produced of a good or output to the inputs) to analyze the issue, producing hundreds of papers.
Given the early scientific productivity of this tradition, we could discuss Freeman's statement that "economists have made a deferential nod in the direction of technological change" (Freeman, 1974: 16) . However, one thing is certain: technological change was concerned with a meaning of and a focus on technological innovation different from
Freeman's. Technological innovation in the first tradition was concerned with process innovation (Godin, 2010a) . The second tradition specifically gave greater place in its analyses to product innovation. 5 Freeman (and his followers) brought a "balance in coverage of process and product innovations" to the field (Freeman, 1974: 37) . Indeed, in the historical part, Freeman documented both processes (in the chemical industry) and products (in synthetic materials and electronics, and their use as processes). This was a fruitful innovation.
6 5 Products and processes are often discussed in term of a dichotomy. However, one industry's new product often becomes another industry's process. As Pavitt once put it: "product innovations in capital and intermediate goods automatically become process process innovations in the industries and services that buy them" (Pavitt and Walker, 1976: 20 ; see also Scherer, 1982b) . The interest in technological innovation as product innovation provided the seed for defining technological innovation as commercialization: a firm bringing a new product to the market for the first time. To Freeman, technological innovation is not the use of technological inventions in production (technological change) but the commercialization of technological inventions -for either consumers (as products) or firms (as processes).
While productivity (ensuing from the use of technological invention in industrial production) was the major issue to the technological change tradition, the issue became the market (the commercialization of the technological invention). However, at the time When Freeman reported that Schumpeter had defined innovation as commercialization (see p. 10 above), he was in fact putting words in Schumpeter's mouth on which he himself wanted to focus. To Freeman, "technical innovation is defined by economists as the first commercial [Freeman's emphasis] application or production of a new process or product" (Freeman, 1974: 166) . Yet, application (use or introduction of an invention or change into a firm) and commercialization (introduction of a product to the market) are two different things. To Schumpeter innovation is not (first) commercialization but "any doing things differently" (Schumpeter, 1939: 84) . Schumpeter has not discussed his five types of innovation -new commodities, new methods, new forms or organization, new sources of supply, and new markets -in terms of commercialization (only the first, as "standard case", is discussed in such terms). He has rather formalized his idea using the vocabulary and method of the technological change tradition -the production functioncombining factors of production in a new way (Schumpeter, 1939: 87-88 ) -in the sense of application or introduction of change. To Schumpeter the entrepreneur innovates in the sense that he combines -not commercializes. Freeman's deifnition is witness to the fuzzy meaning of innovation at the time.
It was not Schumpeter but Maclaurin who defined innovation as commercialization in the late 1940s (Godin, 2008 (Carter and Williams, 1958: 108).
On another concern of the technological change tradition, Freeman certainly started his discussions of chemical processes as being "fundamental to the growth of productivity [my italics] and of the economy" and used some input and output measurements as empirical evidence (Freeman, 1974: 43 concerning the role of large firms in technological innovation (or rather R&D). Freeman makes some (but only some) references to these authors (see also Freeman, 1971) , so he was not ignorant of the tradition on technological change. However, in choosing not to discuss part of this tradition, not ignoring it completely but certainly minimizing it, he was constructing a new perspective, one that became a new tradition.
In fact, there exist at least two strategies for inventing a new tradition: contrasting it to a previous one, or ignoring the previous tradition. The tradition on technological change had already produced a voluminous series of studies at the time of Freeman's book, particularly on gains in productivity from the use of technological invention in industrial production. Freeman did not discuss these findings. 10 10 R. R. Nelson used a different strategy. He criticized the first tradition explicitly on many occasions since the late 1970s, contrasting it to the second one. However, Nelson's polarity refers to "method" only: the first tradition (he does not use this term) is characterized by formal theorizing (statistical and logical) as distinct from the second, which is rather appreciative theorizing (empirical and interpretative). But there is one more difference: the object of study and the meaning of innovation (use of invention vs. commercialization of invention). In matters of method, I would rather suggest a threefold distinction:
He recommends what he calls a "direct" measurement of innovations (counting their number based on lists) as an indicator, 11 rather than productivity gains, which is not mentioned at all. The aim in using this indicator is identifying "first commercial production", in line with what economists' interest is or should be (Freeman, 1974: 166, 174) , rather than invention as R&D expenditures and patents document (Freeman, 1974: 91-96; 199; 206-209 ; see also Freeman, 1971 ).
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In his introduction, Freeman deplored the fact that economists had not studied technological innovation and had retained it only as a residual (Freeman, 1974: 16-17, 32 ). This deserves qualification. Certainly, it is true for R. Solow -who got into the field by accident -and his much cited (because formalized) paper. Nevertheless, there was for some decades a literature on technological change, of American origins, whose several authors worked to reduce the residual in the 1960s. It is on his evaluation of these efforts that, in the 1982 edition of his book, Freeman offers, finally, a reason for rejecting the tradition: "most economists have given up now on the purely statistical attempts to aggregate the production function and the disaggregation of the components of technical change". To Freeman, the accuracy of these estimates was poor (Freeman, 1982a: 196 ).
Freeman's cherished statisticians were rather the English and left-wing scientist J. D.
Bernal and his measurements of a national "budget of science", and the OECDalthough he takes pains to document the limitations of the organization's statistics.
Freeman's statistics are descriptive statistics, either absolute or comparative (Freeman, 1974: 175) rather than econometric. In his negative evaluation of econometrics, Freeman was quite severe. The tradition was in good shape at the time of his book, it has continued Ironically, productivity issues would later come back more strongly in the tradition in another form: national productivity as an indicator of competitiveness between countries. Similarly, unemployment issues will continue to be discussed in the tradition as well (Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982) .
mathematical, descriptive (rather than interpretative), and historical. Each is typical of a specific community: technological change, innovation studies, and economic historians. The historical approach is largely absent from the first two traditions. 11 Lists of (important) innovations is a type of data available from surveys. The first such lists were published in the 1930s (US National Research Council), followed by Carter and Williams in the late 1950s.
Freeman originally suggested the idea as after-thought on output indicators in the OECD Frascati manual that he wrote (OECD, 1962: 37) then to UNESCO (Freeman, 1969: 25) . 12 In 1982, one more rationale was offered: technological innovation as a measurement of R&D efficiency (output) or "cost-effectiveness" (Freeman, 1982a: 53-54 (Langrish et al., 1972) . On precursors on risk and technological innovation, see Lange (1943) and Strassman (1959 As long as Freeman's purpose was not to write history, his 'selective' combination was in a sense 'normal'. This is what conceptual construction is. However, it is more problematic when such a selection comes from 'histories' of the field. In the last few years, papers have appeared that attempt to 'map' the field of technological innovation studies and identify the classic authors behind current research (Martin, 2008; Fagerberg and Vespagen, 2009) . Such studies are definitely witness to the fact that this field is becoming 'mature' enough to look back at its own scientific production. At the same time, these studies help to provide or to strengthen the identity of a community of scholars around key ideas and authors. However, the danger is that such assessments may function as promotional material for a particular vision of innovation. These studies portray the field as a linear progression from Schumpeter to a neo-Schumpeterian (or "evolutionary") tradition, without discussing the first tradition as such nor most of the authors involved. 16 I will come back to Schumpeter below.
Policy as Application
The second perspective Freeman brought to the field was the national policy dimension, consideration of which is relatively absent in the first tradition. This is, to my mind fed the OEEC and the OECD efforts to promote the development of science policies among European countries (OEEC, 1959; OEEC, 1960; OECD, 1963a) , and to measure trends in R&D and the outcome of policies (OECD, 1962) . To the OECD, technological innovation became a means to economic growth, productivity and market shares (OECD, 1966; 1970) . The then-fashionable model was (and still is) the United States. Adopting
American technology and producing more innovative products would improve firms' productivity and open new markets to Europeans.
The European discourses on lags and gaps, largely fed by the OECD, got into technological innovation studies early on and still continues to be discussed today. 17 To a certain extent, SPRU, founded by Freeman in 1966, was a 'spin-off' from the OECD.
Freeman had acted as consultant to the OECD from the early 1960s. He wrote the first edition of the Frascati manual (OECD, 1962) , then co-produced a policy paper for the first ministerial conference on science (OECD, 1963b) and a methodological study on measuring science (Freeman and Young, 1965) . Thereafter, Freeman remained a consultant to the organization (as well as to UNESCO) and participated as expert in many committees responsible for OECD policy reports. Many of his concepts owe to work with this organization.
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Together with some other public organizations, the OECD is responsible for the fulllength discussion of technological innovation -as commercialized invention. Between the early 1960s and 1974, namely between Freeman's first thoughts on technological innovation and his book, the representation of technological innovation as commercialized innovation has 'matured' and governments have been a major contributor to the diffusion of the representation. As a matter of fact, among the early titles published on technological innovation, those from public organizations are 17 Freeman has used the concepts (together with that of 'disparity') regularly in the 1960s in his study conducted at the British National Institute for Economic and Social Research, some of them financed by the OECD (Freeman, Young and Fuller, 1963; Freeman and Hirsh, 1965; Freeman, Harlow and Fuller, 1965; Freeman, 1968; Freeman and Ray, 1969) . See also Freeman, 1971. 18 In addition to 'gap' (called 'disparity' in Freeman and Young (1965) produced for the OECD), Freeman's concept of 'research-intensive industries' was first suggested in his report to the first OECD ministerial conference on science (OECD, 1963b) , and 'explicit' (and 'direct') policy, as discussed below, had precursors in the organization too (OECD, 1963a; OECD, 1966 These public reports also carried a policy perspective and Freeman was following in these footsteps when he suggested that technological "innovation may be regarded as the ultimate aim [and output] of most applied research and experimental development" (Freeman 1969 ) and necessitates public support. Yet, over seventy-five percent of public R&D is devoted to national security and prestige types of R&D (nuclear, military, space).
In contrast, there is low priority accorded to welfare and environment. To Freeman, the preferential treatment of public R&D to technological innovation of a "non-economic nature" (the "military-industrial complex") is due to an advocacy process ("habit, lobby and prestige", as he put it), rather than "any sophisticated project evaluation techniques"
or "elaborate calculations of return on investment" (Freeman, 1974: 286-87 ). To
Freeman, "there is a failure in the market mechanism and also of the political mechanism in relation to technical change in consumer goods and services" (Freeman, 1974: 308) .
Freeman believed that "new factors are at work" which could and should change the priorities. These new factors were the reduction of tensions between the superpowers, the change in public opinion and social values, and the emergence of new problems.
There was a need for "a social mechanism for stimulating, monitoring and regulating innovation, which does not yet exist in any country" and a need for greater "public participation in the process of consumer-oriented innovations", stated Freeman (Freeman, 1974: 308) . Freeman argued for "consumer sovereignty" in relation to technological innovation. Users of technology (buyers and consumers) should have a say in designing 19 The discussion of innovation as commercialization goes hand in hand with that of competitiveness in terms of market shares of new products. 20 Freeman has never cited any source for his (early) conception of technological innovation as commercialized invention (see Freeman, Young and Fuller, 1963: 38; Freeman, 1971: 1 technology. To this end, he offers several suggestions and "coupling mechanisms" like standards and regulations (including on advertising), "direct stimulus" for designs and product development, public representation on committees and, above all, technology assessments. Furthermore, to Freeman, "national science priorities" should be established to support science and technology based on "its contribution to social welfare" (Freeman, 1974: 307) . "Present R&D project selection techniques are biased overwhelmingly towards technical and short-term competitive economic criteria (…).
[They] should take into account aesthetic criteria, work satisfaction criteria, environment criteria and other social costs and benefits which today are almost excluded from consideration" (Freeman, 1974: 309) .
The emphasis on consumers, or third stage of science and technology policy as he called it later (Freeman, 1982a: 200) , is a direct consequence of Freeman's perspective on technological innovation as commercialized inventions (that diffuse through society).
However, in the following decades the analysis of many of the issues involved in the consumer dimension would be left to Science-Technology-Society (STS) studies.
Similarly, although "social innovations" like organizational, institutional and legal changes "may often be just as important as technical change" (Freeman, 1982a: 216) , their study has remained a residual in the tradition. Like official policy documents in which discussion of "social innovation" in the early 1970s was short-lived (an erreur de parcours of the mid-1970s, like the Brooks report; see OECD 1971), the customer would soon be forgotten in 'innovation studies' (although the customer may, to a certain extent, have come back recently with 'open innovation' and like concepts).
As we have seen above, researchers from the second tradition contrast their own tradition to the black-box of mainstream economists. They developed one more contrast: neoclassical economics versus evolutionary economics. Neo-classical economists focus on prices and equilibrium to explain firm's (rational) behaviour, while evolutionary economists look at the adaptive response of firms to changes in their environment (Freeman, 1974: 253-55; 281-82) . In policy matters, the former is said to explain and justify the government's role in the economy on the basis of market failures, while the latter looks at a more complex set of institutions and rules (Nelson, 2009 should be established in the last part of the twentieth century and national policy should be concerned to promote other kinds of innovation" (than those "largely determined by the Cold War") (Freeman, 1974: 41) : reallocation of R&D resources 22 "must therefore be the main concern of national policy for science and technology" (Freeman, 1974: 41) , better coupling with the users of innovations, and improvements in consumer goods and services must become priorities (Freeman, 1974: 41-42) .
While the policy perspective distinguishes the tradition from that on technological change, as I have argued here, it thus also makes the field an application-oriented specialty. 23 As reflected in the journal Research Policy and the many books published at Edward Elgar, every discussion on technological innovation includes policy recommendations. Whether the policy perspective drives the conceptual constructions of academics on technological innovation or vice versa is difficult to say precisely. One thing is certain: given that many researchers work both in academia and public organizations as consultants, both perspectives go hand in hand and the ideas travel in both directions (Miettinen, 2002) .
21 Sometimes this set is called "historical" or "historical context" (Freeman, 1974: 255) , but I prefer institutional or contextual. Certainly, the context and institutions have a history, but most of the analyses of the tradition are not historical, except in the sense discussed above (p. 12-13). More often than not, history (of a rather recent time span by the way) comes after the conceptual work in "innovation studies", as a background or residual piece of evidence, although placed first in books and papers. 22 From the military to environment, energy, natural resources, transport, quality of life and underdevelopment. 23 The most active researchers on science policy in the early years of SPRU were Keith Pavitt and R. Rothwell with W. Zegveld.
Legitimization
Two authors contributed substantially to Freeman's framework. The conceptual construction begins by using F. Machlup's "wide definition of knowledge industries" (Freeman, 1974: 18) , as covering the "generating, disseminating, and applying advances in technology" (Freeman, 1974: 20) . It allows Freeman to suggest the idea of an "R&D system" (first suggested in a paper produced for UNESCO in 1969) . There is no explicit definition of what a system is, but one understands that it means a complex whole responsible for "the ultimate source of economic advance" (Freeman, 1974: 20) :
production of new products and processes, management and marketing, diffusion (including education and training) and interaction with science (Freeman, 1974: 20-21) .
Above all, Freeman's system refers to a "professionalized system" whose "growth is perhaps the most important social and economic change in twentieth-century industry" (Freeman, 1974: 21) .
The use of Machlup's approach is interesting, as it is totally foreign to the first tradition.
Machlup's vision is a broad one, looking at both technological invention and its diffusion, and it would come to characterize the institutional perspective of the second tradition 2010c) . Furthermore, Machlup's systemic analysis of the knowledge system in terms of flows of measurable quantities of input and output (his "Machlup is concerned principally with identifying and quantifying the inputs and outputs of the knowledge-producing parts of the economy and only secondarily with analyzing the function of knowledge and information in the economic system" (Nelson, 1963) . 24 Despite criticism in America, this kind of analysis and the descriptive statistics suggested by Machlup became very influential among European researchers.
However, it was not Machlup but Schumpeter who got pre-eminence in the second tradition. On many issues, Freeman gives credit to Schumpeter: Schumpeter "gave innovation pride of place in his models" (Freeman, 1974: 22) ; "we owe to Schumpeter the extremely important distinction between inventions and innovations" (Freeman, 1974: 22) ; Schumpeter "rightly pointed out the crucial role of the entrepreneur" (Freeman, 1974: 22) . Nevertheless, in the end Freeman did not defer to Schumpeter. Schumpeter was treated like any other author -he is discussed on one page only and his name does not even appear in the index. Freeman deplored the fact that Schumpeter treated innovation as exogenous to economics (Freeman, 1974: 22) ; "still less did he have any concept of science policy" (Freeman, 1974: 22) . Yet, to Freeman, the R&D system "can be subjected to economic analysis" -in line with Machlup's suggestion: "For the economists, it is obviously desirable to examine the operations of this R&D system from the standpoint of its efficiency in employing scarce resources [input-output]" (Freeman, 1974: 26) . The resistance to looking at R&D in this sense led to neglecting the study of the whole process of innovation. To correct the situation, Freeman suggested a series of specific questions of an economic nature (Freeman, 1974: 26-27 ).
This critical (or balanced) use of Schumpeter in the emerging stage of the tradition would soon begin to change. The 1982 edition of Freeman's book contained a "new chapter on unemployment" (presented as such in the acknowledgments, p. vii). However, the chapter is more than this. It gives central place to Schumpeter and elects the label "neoSchumpeterianism" as defining the tradition. Although Schumpeter "had relatively little to say about unemployment and wages" Freeman stated (Freeman, 1982a: 209) , he nevertheless made "an outstanding original contribution": "more than any other twentieth-century economist [Schumpeter] attempted to explain cycles in economic growth largely in terms of technical innovation" (Freeman, 1982a: 207) . "Major 24 Nelson was then working within the mainstream framework, as most American economists did. See Nelson (1964) . structural crises, or adjustment" led by technical innovations explain economic growth and employment. These innovations were seen as major ones (discontinuous), together with the minor innovations that follow and form clusters. To Freeman, such would be a "neo-Schumpeterian interpretation" of the post-war boom (Freeman, 1982a: 208) .
Freeman then complements (one more combination) this interpretation on autonomous invention and entrepreneurship, or supply, with an opposite one on demand, as developed by J. Schmookler, and concludes: "science and technology would tend to dominate in the early stages, whilst demand tends to take over as the industry becomes established" (Freeman, 1982a: 211) . Following A. Phillips, Freeman thereafter discovers two models in Schumpeter -and brings forth two schematic representations (Freeman, 1982a: 212-13 ): one in which science and technology are exogenous (1912) , and the other in which they are endogenous (1942) . 25 He next adds diffusion to the models (and contrasts it to the previous diffusion theory, like E. Mansfield's studies of the 1960s which put the emphasis on the adopters' profit rather than suppliers): innovators are attracted by potential profits too. The result is that, over time, innovations tend to focus increasingly on cost-reducing process rather than new products (a recurrent topic of the tradition on technological change). This is a source of unemployment -hence Freeman's interest in products rather than processes as sources of employment.
Over time, Schumpeter has become THE starting point of technological innovation studies in the second tradition, as though he stood alone. This reductionist view is present elsewhere in the academic literature. For example, J. M. Staudenmaier's survey of the history of technology as seen through papers published in Technology and Culture states that "the term 'innovation' appears to have originated in a tradition of economic analysis" (Staudenmaier, 1985: 56) . Freeman himself, as mentioned above, attributed the "important" distinction between invention and innovation to Schumpeter and suggested that it "has since been generally incorporated into economic theory" (Freeman, 1974: 22) .
There is also the sequence: invention → innovation → diffusion, which is (wrongly) attributed regularly to Schumpeter. 26 History is quite different. From its very beginning, the study of technological innovation was represented by a plurality of voices. The above ideas developed over time, many authors having incrementally contributed to their construction, both before and after
Schumpeter. There has been no direct (or explicit and continuous) tradition of research from Shumpeter to the early technological innovation studies -Maclaurin is an exception -but rather a resurrection or "renaissance" (Freeman, 2003) . And it is Maclaurin's ideas which are resurrected, in obliterated form, as much as those of Schumpeter. It is interesting to note that the very first survey of the field made no reference to Schumpeter -but did refer to Maclaurin (Nelson, 1959) . 27 Similarly, the early students who studied technological innovation in the second tradition (before the tradition existed as such), like
Carter and Williams (1957), Jewkes et al. (1958) and Langrish et al. (1972) , as well as
Freeman himself (Freeman, 1971; SPRU, 1972) , did not cite Schumpeter. As a matter of fact, they did not need Schumpeter at all to discuss many of the issues that would occupy the second tradition, above all the commercialization of technological invention. When some did cite Schumpeter, it was to discuss his very general and later hypothesis (or speculation) on the size of firms (Nelson, Peck and Kalachek, 1967; Mansfield, 1968 ) -on this issue Freeman used Galbraith in his early works rather than Schumpeter (Freeman, 1971) . It is these studies together with the early contributions of Americans beginning in the mid-1950s 28 that constitute the missing link in recent "histories" of the field, which focus on Schumpeter and jump too quickly right to "neo-
26 See M.J. Peck and I.R. Siegel in NBER (1962: 317; 445) and Rosenberg (1976: 67) . In Freeman (1994: 480) , Freeman talks of the "Schumpeterian concept" of "diffusion". Schumpeter was rather concerned with "imitation" and followers among entrepreneurs, not diffusion (a term he uses only once) of innovations through the economy and society. Schumpeter has not studied diffusion but has jumped from innovations to their effects on the economy (business cycles). Schumpeter may have had the "idea" of diffusion, but not the "concept". 27 To be honest, this survey was concerned with invention not innovation. However, Maclaurin was concerned with the latter. At the same time as Schumpeter was taking central place in analyses of the second tradition, other authors really got eclipsed. We have already mentioned the absence of references to the tradition on technological change as well as to the historical tradition (or approach) from Maclaurin. The latter was killed (literally) by the first tradition for being a historiographer and not an econometrician (on Maclaurin's suicide, see Godin, 2008) .
The second tradition 'killed' Maclaurin a second time. Certainly, Freeman cites
Maclaurin (Maclaurin, 1949 ) -as some others did at the time in footnotes -but for his work on the history of radio (Freeman, 1974: 112, 115) and not for his "theory" (or model as most researchers called the linear view of technological innovation) which has nevertheless remained influential for decades. Sociologists on technological innovation merited the same neglect. W. F. Ogburn is not cited at all (Godin, 2010b) . Only Jewkes et al. as sociologists are cited -because they are concerned with firms.
Why was Schumpeter resurrected? There is nothing wrong with resurrecting a forgotten author. One may find in a lost author the framework and ideas he seeks for his own construction. However, it may also have to do with identity, originality and legitimacy.
Having no established conceptual framework on which to build its case, as the first tradition did -the second tradition itself is the 'inventor' of the framework -authors elected Schumpeter, made of him an authority and a symbolic father and invented a genealogy (widely shared in handbooks, surveys -or mappings -and "histories" -or stories -of the tradition). 29 Together with 'killing' other authors, the field could pretend to an autonomous status. 'Big names' like Schumpeter, often help 'sell' one's own idea, more so if they were poorly esteemed in their own time. Without doubt, Schumpeter is an original author among economists. But many more contributors would have to be added to a story (and history) of thoughts on technological innovation to make it 'scientific'. industries, and between countries (Freeman, 1982a: 220 restore the economic health of the mature industrialized countries" (Freeman, 1982a: 220) . To Freeman, following a then-recent OECD document in which he participated as expert (OECD, 1980) , three "sets of technology policies seem particularly relevant":
encouraging firms to take up radical inventions/innovations, improving the diffusion of technological innovations, and importing foreign technology.
To Freeman, government policy should be explicit (deliberate) policy rather than implicit. The vocabulary used to discuss such an explicit policy is normative and prescriptive, as in 1974: policy is relevant, important, meritorious, essential, useful ... (Freeman, 1982a: 220-22 (the only one) for improving the income of the population and reducing unemployment (Freeman, 1982a: 224) .
In 1974, Freeman suggested that monitoring and controlling technology will stop "the sense of alienation from modern technology" (Freeman, 1974: 31) , and that more emphasis on improving consumer technologies will bring "greater satisfaction with the results of technical change" (Freeman, 1974: 42) . Such statements certainly serve a discourse on universals, but fundamentally they rest on a hard-to-eliminate assumption (and reality?): the aim of policy, particularly in its diffusion-of-technology dimension, is that of adjusting the people to the technology rather than the technology to the people. In the end, the economics of technological innovation and policies (and to a large extent of research policy as a specialty) concentrates on the supply side (firms). As Freeman put it:
"this book has been concerned with innovation at the firm level (…) because in capitalist societies most industrial R&D is performed by enterprises and innovations are made by firms" (Freeman, 1974: 287) .
A Theory or Tradition?
A question spontaneously arises. Has Freeman produced a theory of innovation? Many answers may be offered. First, Freeman's book certainly is one the most comprehensive for the time on many issues related to the study of technological innovation as it would later develop. Nevertheless, it remains a collection of issues, discussed one after the other, chapter after chapter. It is like a survey of the field. 30 Freeman ends the book without summing up his findings, which are discussed as separate parts. He turns rather to policy. To be honest, Freeman never pretended to offer a comprehensive theory of innovation: "a more integrated theory of innovation is desirable, but it is beyond the scope of this short book" (Freeman, 1974: 39) . Freeman rather offers "generalizations", as he suggested (Freeman, 1974: 161) , on certain aspects of technological innovation and firms designed to test the literature's "conjectures" (Freeman, 1974: 170) , 31 but no theory.
Second, one observes that over time Freeman indeed contributed to "theories". However, these contributions concern very specific aspects of technological innovation, like the role of technological innovation in economic waves. Third, Freeman also constructed broad conceptual frameworks, like those on "new technology systems" and National Innovation System, which have been influential in the tradition (see Appendix).
However, a conceptual framework is not a theory.
One would be hard pressed to find a comprehensive theory of innovation in Freeman. A comprehensive theory of innovation would address innovations in ideas, things and behaviours -not only in technology. It wouldcover three dimensions: 1) the origins or sources of invention and its development, 2) its diffusion and use, and 3) its effects or impacts (economic as well as social, cultural, environmental, etc.); and would integrate the three dimensions into a single whole. A fourth dimension would look at the context or 30 Freeman would conduct a survey proper twenty years later (Freeman, 1994) . 31 For example, to Freeman the literature on success and failure of firms is one-sided (Freeman, 1974: 167) and is either "scattered case histories lacking comparability of coverage or theoretical analysis lacking systematic empirical foundations" (Freeman, 1974 : 170 This in itself has been a very fruitful innovation, at least if one looks at the volume of papers produced and the demands made on the researchers for expertise in public organizations.
Conclusion
With The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Freeman launched a whole tradition of research on technological innovation. SPRU researchers would continue on Freeman's perspective, and would soon be imitated by other groups worldwide. Certainly the tradition has evolved considerably since Freeman's book, and Freeman himself has been a major contributor to this development. However, the root of the tradition as it now exists was (to many extents) established in this book.
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Many issues of the story remain to be studied. This paper is only a beginning to the history and sociology of the specialty. What this paper has left to others to study is following Freeman's book through time: by whom was it used and cited (this is easily done with bibliometrics) and for what purposes and with what impact on the ideas of the 32 Freeman admits this interpretation. For example, on his thoughts on firms' strategies he concluded as follows: "The sketchy discussion in this chapter is not intended as an alternative theory of firm behaviour. Such a theory requires a greater integrative effort in the social sciences than I am capable of. But it is intended to indicate the kind of issues which must be embraced by any theory which seeks to explain the firm's adaptive response to technological change" (Freeman, 1974: 282) . 33 Contrary to Freeman's expectations: "There are encouraging indications that social scientists from several disciplines, including economists, are beginning to tackle the development of a more comprehensive theory of the firm" (Freeman, 1974: 282) . 34 Over time, one may find two "conceptualizations" of technological innovation: a "linear model of innovation", and an interactive view. The first is a (now discredited) theoretical construct, and is more often than not called a "model". The second is not a theory nor a theoretical construct but an approach. It is a way of looking at and studying technological innovation. 35 For an overview of the tradition today, see Fagernberg et al. (2005) . At the same time as being an (academic) innovator, Freeman has been an advocate, or "innovative ideologist" as Quentin Skinner would say (Skinner, 2002a: chapter 8-10; 2002b, chapter 4) . Freeman wrote in response to existing theories and promoted or defended a new point of view: innovation is the commercialization of technological invention, the method of study is descriptive (contextual I would add, not really historical), and policy has a large role to play in the analysis, which gave the field its normative dimension. While the tradition regarding technological change grew out of issues of technological unemployment and productivity, the second tradition developed from interest in management and policy interest, as much as from purely economic interest: opening the black box to help society (government?) get more out of technological innovation. Innovation as technological innovation emerged out of the instrumentalization of innovation for policy purposes (Godin, 2011) . However, there is continuity between the two traditions too. Like the first tradition, this one focuses on innovation as technological innovation, on firms and on economic growth as the ultimate outcome (see Table 1 ). Compared to the field today, few issues were missing in Freeman's work (as with the 1960 conference) -except globalization, a 'recent' 36 G.M. Hodgson has already made a similar argument: Schumpeter's name is widely invoked as the spiritual symbol for Schumpeter as "spiritual symbol" and "father" (Hodgson, 1993: 150). phenomenon. In this sense, and despite (or precisely because of) their limitations, the recent studies which map the field are witness to what 'innovation studies' and the community really are: economics, management and policy. In recent years, 'innovation studies' has been used to name the field by many researchers of the second tradition. As such, the labelling suggests a monopoly, as if the tradition covers all that concerns innovation, while it rather studies it from a particular perspective.
Different perspectives on innovation exist (like Shavinina, 2003) , but these are eclipsed in the tradition. Few critical discussions are conducted in the tradition on what innovation is but, as Freeman did, a particular definition is brought forth from the start. 'Innovation studies' specialized on technological innovation in organizational settings (firms). To take just one example: both the recent Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2005) and the literature on National Innovation Systems (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) gravitate around the firm and the market: how best to facilitate the 37 Although not a tradition in the sense discussed in this paper, RAND is included here as early contributor to the field. See Godin, 2010a. 38 Including processes as products.
commercialization and use of technological inventions. The institutional (and social) aspects of the innovation system are studied for their contribution to the innovative performance of firms. Social issues remain a residual (a residual similar to the one Freeman criticized earlier) and are relegated to others to study.
Whatever its name, 'innovation studies' may have hegemony perhaps, but no monopoly.
This hegemony owes its existence to two factors. One is the fact that researchers in the specialty have appropriated the term innovation, while others do not use it as a distinctive marker, although they are concerned to different degrees with innovation too. The other factor is the official (government) discourse, which understands innovation as technological innovation, thus legitimizing the understanding of 'innovation studies' and making it dominant.
Limiting ourselves to technological innovation (and putting aside the voluminous literature on innovation broadly defined), there have been three traditions of 'innovation studies' in economics: historical (Godin, 2008) , technological change (Godin, 2010a) and technological innovation (this paper). The last two share similar assumptions, although they carry different perspectives. In this sense, they have both contributed to a shared understanding of innovation among policy-makers and the public. Nevertheless, the two traditions live in (almost) total ignorance of each another. Each has emerged on a different continent, and continues to inhabit that continent -with few exceptions.
(broadly defined) at the time. However, it is another author who suggested to Freeman the idea of an "innovation system". A careful reading of Chapter 9 suggests an adaptation of J.K. Galbraith's "military-industrial complex". In fact, to Freeman Galbraith's work on the emergence of a techno-structure is "consistent" with his own argument (Freeman, 1974: 217; 282) . To Freeman, the "military-industrial complex is a reality" (Freeman, 1974: 287) . It corresponds to a stage (1950s and 1960s) when R&D investments were devoted to big science, and industrial and government R&D expenditures to "national security and prestige types": nuclear, military and space (Freeman, 1974: 288) . This complex Freeman relabeled as the "military innovation system" (Freeman, 1974: 296) .
39
To Freeman, this innovation system was followed by a second and different one.
Certainly, "the achievements of the military innovation system are undoubted", stated
Freeman (Freeman, 1974: 296 ). Yet, it was founded on the assumption of producer sovereignty. To Freeman, the 1970s was a new stage in R&D. It was witness to changing values (reduction in tensions between the superpowers, changes in public opinion, emergence of new problems) and new priorities. Freeman anticipated a shift from a "military-innovation system" to a "social innovation system", whose challenge is "more complex than that facing purely technical innovators" (Freeman, 1974: 301 ). Freeman's prospective is based on the analysis of the then-recent OECD statistics on trends in R&D expenditures in industrialized countries. The new innovation system would be a shift from military to customer R&D, from producer sovereignty to customer sovereignty.
To complete the picture and reach the subsequent concept of "National" Innovation System, one more element has to be added to the story. To Freeman, the later stage (consumer sovereignty) will become a reality only if supported by national policies. The "social innovation system" is (should be) characterized by national policy designed to orient R&D decisions toward social welfare. "The problem for policy is to articulate [the 39 The first reference to the military innovation system is to be found in 1967: "The highly developed US 'research-innovation' system in the military sector has been well analyzed by Krauch; this system has probably helped to raise professional standards of 'innovation management'" (Freeman, 1967: 467) . After carefully looking at the book (special thanks to Manfred Moldashl for help), I have found no use of 'innovation system', 'system of innovation' or similar in Krauch. The author is rather concerned with system analysis. The wording on innovation system is Freeman's. new] demands in such a way that the system can respond effectively" (Freeman, 1974: 296) . Policy has to be made explicit (deliberate) rather than implicit (the affairs of a "lobby" or laissez-innover). A "political mechanism must restore the lost consumer sovereignty" (Freeman, 1974: 303) , and "a social mechanism [must be developed] for stimulating, monitoring and regulating innovation, which does not yet exist in any country" (Freeman, 1974: 308) . Users should have a role to play in designing appropriate technologies and government should define (national) priorities. Coupling mechanisms and policies have to be invented to this end.
At the time, "innovation system" was definitively not a fully crystallized concept. The term appeared under many other guises in Freeman's book: "monopolist or socialist system of innovation" (Freeman, 1974: 223) , "innovation system" (Freeman, 1974: 253) and "world research innovation system" (Freeman, 1974: 279) , with no theoretical development. Freeman was not theorizing on innovation systems as such, but discussing "aspects of public policy for innovation". Freeman's purpose (one of his purposes) is clearly policy-oriented and normative. In fact, the changing values Freeman identified were only in the making. Freeman made himself a "prospectivist" here and consequently called for changing priorities in government policy (in order to make a reality of thenchanging values). He suggested orienting the innovation system towards national (and explicit) priorities. It is only later that the idea of innovation system got 'objectivity': in the late 1980s and after National Innovation System became a "fact" to be studied. From that time on, authors have forgotten the origins of the concept.
Freeman's book is no longer read. Students turn rather to the 1982 edition. One would have difficulty finding a genealogy as described above in this edition. Most of the terms and variants on innovation system still appear, but split as they are over two chapters (rather than one as in 1974) the argument on innovation system is less apparent. But it is still there, the vocabulary is similar -and F. List is still missing -although the later begins to appear in another paper that same year (Freeman, 1982b ): Galbraith's "militaryindustrial complex" (Freeman, 1982a: 190) , "military innovation system" (Freeman, 1982a: 202) , "technological system" (Freeman, 1982a: 218) , "social innovation" (Freeman, 1982a: 201, 205, 216 ) plus a three-page discussion on "institutional, organizational, legal and social changes", also called innovations (Freeman, 1982a: 216-18 ). In a recent paper, Godin documented what a 'system approach' in science studies owes to national policy and the discussions conducted on this matter in industrialized countries beginning in the early 1960s, above all at the OECD (to the best of my knowledge, the first use of "innovation system" is OECD, 1969). Over the same period, the system approach found its way into official statistics, which helped solidify the approach (Godin, 
